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Abstract.  In this paper we introduce basic notions of a new 
economic model where preference relations on commodities set are 
represented by a group action on Euclidean space instead of utility 
function. Conditions that ensure the existence of individual demand 
function and a general equilibrium in the setting of exchange economy 
are examined. 
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Introduction 
 
The mathematical modern conception of general economic equilibrium 
(GEE) is provided by Arrow-Debreu model developed from 1950 (Arrow, 
Debreu, 1954). This model pictures the economy as a collection of m economic 
agents who make supply and demand decisions over a finite set of l 
commodities in order to further their own interests. The general equilibrium 
research program then studies many properties of economy, particularly the 
price, choices of agents, individual and aggregated demand functions (Balasko, 
1998). 
In a pure exchange model, all agents are consumers, and each of them is 
provided with a preference relation represented by a utility function on R
l and 
an initial endowment e ∈ R
l
+ representing his supply offer in the market. Agents 
are assumed to take as given the market prices of goods. In exchange for his 
supply, each agent tries to choose the consumption bundle which maximizes his 
utility given his budget constraint. Such bundle represents the individual 
demand. Aggregated demand of an economy is the sum of all individual ones, 
and it is clearly a function of price. 
Equilibrium is by definition the vector price  p  ∈ R
l  which makes all 
markets clear (Supply = Demand). The centerpiece of the subject (GEE) deals 
with the existence and properties of equilibrium. To ensure an affirmative 
answer to that question, many conditions on preference relations, and hence on 
utility functions, are assumed. In summary, it is assumed that preferences are 
continuous, monotonic and convex, or equivalently, utility functions are 
differentiable and concave.     
 When these conditions hold for all agents, the economy is then called 
neoclassical, and equilibrium prices can be reached (Aliprantis et al., 1989). 
The aim of this paper is to build a new general formulation of consumers' 
choice where rationality involves not only maximization of preference, but also 
a well defined reference of choice, hence our terminology of Economy of 
Referential Preference (ERP). Although it is clear that this approach can 
replace, in many instances, the conventional one based on utility function, it is 
not our main purpose in this paper. In some way, we prove here that the 
rationality of economic agents can be treated in a diffrent manner than by utility 
function.  
In first section we treat several examples that show the consistency of the 
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function. In section two we give a basic definition of an ERP and we end by 
proving our main result (theorem 8) establishing the existence of an equilibrium 
in such economy. 
 
1. Motivations and examples of referential preference 
 
In this section it is shown by examples that preference relations on 
commodities set can be represented by a group action on     . This viewpoint 
sheds some new light on the economic rationality and conditions of 
equilibrium. In this work we will touch only a few aspects of group theory and 
knowledge of elementary matricial calculus is sufficient (see Roman, 2012, for 
details and many examples of group action).  
We begin by a simple example where we can see that indifference sets of 
utility function may be represented, or more precisely replaced by group action 
on 	   . Here and subsequently   
 
 denotes the positive cone of 	   , and   
   
 
 = {x ∈	   / xi > 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ l }.  
 
Example 1. The commodity space is R 
  and the utility function u is:  
u: R 
  ⟶ R, u(x,y)=xy.  
 
We choose the one-parameter's subgroup G of GL(2, R), 
G={	 
a0
01 / a  , a ∈	R 
∗ }.  
The action α of  G on R
2  is simply the matricial one on the Euclidean 
space, namely: αg	 
x
y	   
ax
y/a 	where g = 	 
a0
01 / a   for some a > 0.  
We assert that indifference sets of u are exactly the orbits for vectors on 
R 
  . Indeed, except the trivial case (c=0) which is obviously a union of two 
orbits, fix c > 0 and the indifference set        
 
 	 ∈   
 	,  
 
 	    	   .  Given 
any commodity  
  
  	 ∈	   , his orbit is nothing but    itself. Actually, for any 
  	 
a0
01 / a  	∈ ,	it is clear that     
x 
y 	  	 
ax 
 
 y 	 ∈	I  . Conversely, any 
commodity    
x  
y  	  ∈	I   is in the orbit  
x 
y 	  since  
x  
y  	   	 
   
  
0
0
   
  
  ∙ 
x 
y 
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a0
01 / a   
x 
y 
 , where   	
   
  
 	
 
   
  
  which is due to the fact that         
	      .  
It remains to show that any orbit is an indifference set. This can be 
deduced from the fact that      	
 
        , and for all   
x  
y  	  such that        
    we have     
   
  0
0
   
 
  ∙ 
x
y   
x  
y  	 .  
As indifference set  is arbitrary, this is sufficient to conclude that the 
description of indifference sets of consumer with given utility function u can be 
efficiently made by a group actions on	R 
 .  
This example gains in interest only if we are able to see how group action 
becomes useful to define a mathematical framework of consumer's theory and 
general equilibrium. In other words, we have to define a complete preordering 
relation on   
   and a consumer maximization problem in this new setting. 
Actually, let be G a topological group and   a continuous action of G on 
R
l. Here and subsequently,    denotes the orbit of x ∈ R
l under group action. It 
is easy to check that any group action induces an equivalence relation on R
l. 
Indeed, such equivalence can be obviously defined as following: 
 ~ 		   		∃	  ∈  	  	         .                                 
But since this is not sufficient to give a totally (complete) preorder on   
  , 
some other conditions are needed.  
 
Axiom 1. Let  X  a non-empty subset of    .  For all  ∈  , there is a 
unique  ∈   
  , such that   ∈   ∙  , where       	 
1
⋮
1
 	∈	  .  
We will denote by   	the unique real v such that we have  ∈   ∙  .  
Of course this implies that the quotient of  X  by the equivalence relation 
induced by the action of group is identified with		  	.  
Clearly, we can deduce a preference relation on X from a group action 
which verifies axiom 1. Indeed, we say that  x is  more  desirable 
than y when 	    	   ,  and they are equivalent if     	    .  
We simply note that     	   	 ⟺	∃	 	∈ ,such	that	         	 	⟺
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The above axiom is not only a simple mathematical hypothesis, but it has 
an evident economic meaning which asserts that consumer compares each 
bundle with a very simple one which is:  ∙      ∙ 
1
⋮
1
 .  
By identifying  ∙    and	  ∈    further analysis may eventually lead to 
interpret   ∙    in terms of a medium of exchange. But this is still just a mere 
eventuality.  
In many examples, axiom 1 is available for all   
    and the above 
preference can be extended to all commodities on   
  . When this is not the case 
we assume that all  ∈	   
    are preferred to anything on the boundary. Taking 
into account this detail, we state the following definition:  
 
Definition 1 
We say that a preference relation  on commodity set  R 
 
 is of reference 
type, or referential, whenever either:  
1. It is given by a continuous and globally invariant group action on 
R 
 
 which satisfies axiom 1. 
2. It is given by a continuous and globally invariant group action 
on  R  
 
 which satisfies axiom 1, and everything in R  
 
 is preferred to 
anything on the boundary. 
Returning to the previous example, where     ,      	     , we can see 
that 	  ≼  	 ⟺            		⟺	       .Actually,            	⟺	     	 
	    , but since    ,    	∈	    and    ,    	∈	   , we have   
         and 
  
        . Under the condition   ,   	 0 it follows that        .  
Now we will solve a simple problem of consumer's demand with no use 
of utility function. The group G are the same as in example 1.  
 
Example 2. Let    
 
 ,
√ 
  	  the price vector and w=200 the budget of the 
consumer.  
To solve the consumer's problem which is  
 
        	  
       	  	   	          	  ∙      , 
we set that     	 
 0
0
 
 
 	 
  
  
  for  some t and    ∈	   
∗ . It's not difficult to 
verify that t and      exist and that they are unique. Actually if   	 	 
  
  
 	∈70                                                                                                                                Teycir Goucha 
 
   
  , then we can see that      √      and   	 
  
  
. The budget constraint 
becomes: 
    , 
 0
0
 
 
 	 
  
  
   	    	 	⟺	
 
      	
√ 
        200	 ⟺	v   
    
   √ 	 
 
We then obtain        
    
   √ , that reaches its maximum at   	√3
  , for 
which we have      200	 √3
     . Finally, the solution of this maximization 
problem gives us    
200
200
√ 
 
  as the consumer's demand. 
To treat the general case we must give necessary and/or sufficient 
conditions on groups and their actions to ensure reliability and efficiency of 
axiom preference and so the existence of individual demand function. Indeed, 
under the axiom 1, we have the following theorem: 
 
Theorem 2. Let be a consumer with referential preference on	R 
   given by 
a group  G. Then, the maximization problem under the budget constraint is 
equivalent to the minimization of a nonnegative continuous real valued function 
on the group G.  
Proof. Since referential preferences are determined by 	      ,  where  
      ∙      , then the demand function is given by the solution of the 
following problem: 
 
 
        	  
       	  	   	          	  ∙      	 
This maximization problem is clearly equivalent to finding the maximal 
value of v, such that 〈 ,  ∙      〉	  . So, we have to maximize         
	
 
〈 ,     〉	 . 
But since       ∈   
    and   ∈    
  , we have 	〈 ,     〉	 0.  As 
〈 ,     〉	 0	∀	 ∈ , continuity of v(g) follows directly from continuity of 
group action and scalar product on	  . As w is fixed, and w and  〈 ,     〉 are 
both positive, then the problem is equivalent to minimizing 〈 ,     〉 for 
 ∈  .                                                                                                                 ⎕ 
In the remainder of this section we assume that referential preferences are 
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Axiom 2. For consumer  i ∈ I,    	 ⊂        ,   , and the group action's 
	 :	       
  	→	   
    which defines his preference relations on the commodity 
space 	  
  , satisfies: there is a unique    ∈   	such	that	 	0	  	〈 ,	      〉	 
	〈 ,	     〉		∀	 	 ∈	  .  
In the following theorem we can see the fundamental role of this group 
element   , which is to determine level of satisfaction     	 and  individual 
demand function. Then our terminology of “referential preferences” is fully 
justified.  
 
Theorem 3. Let    ∈	   
   the initial endowment of consumer  i whose 
preference is defined by a group   . Then its demand function is explicitly 
given by: 
 
   :	   
  →	   
  ,			        	
  
  〈 ,   〉
   
     ∙  
where    	       ∙ , and     	〈 ,  〉 is the budget of consumer i. 
 
Proof. Let be  	 ∈	   
      the giving vector price. By theorem 2 the 
maximization problem is equivalent to minimize 〈 ,     〉 for	  ∈   . But 
since   	 ∈	   
 
 , there is    ∈    and     0  such that   	        ∙ ). Then 
we have to minimize 	〈    ∙ ,    ∙ 〉  for   ∈    . Now 〈    ∙ ,    ∙ 〉  
〈 ,        ∙ 〉  and by axiom 2, the minimum is given for     	    ∙  or 
equivalently      
   ∙   . Finally,        		
  
  〈 ,   ∙ 〉  and:  
 
                
     ∙  
  
  〈 ,   ∙ 〉   
     ∙                                   ⎕ 
 
Remark 4. Since  	 ∈	   
  , we can also write    	    ∙ , where      
is the diagonal matrix with entries 	     	     0 .  In  other  words  
        ∙     ∙ .   And 
 
  
   
   ∙  	   
   ∙ ,   and the individual demand 
function for consumer i takes this form:  
        	
〈   ∙ ,	    〉
〈 ,    ∙ 〉
  
   ∙     ∙ . 	  
 
Corollary 5. The demand function is homogeneous of degree 0. 
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Proof. Let 	  ∈	  
∗ , from the above expression of individual demand 
function         	
〈  ∙ ,	  〉
〈 ,   ∙ 〉   
   ∙     ∙ . As    is a diagonal matrix form of the p 
vector, then           	 and 	   
    	      . This clearly implies	         
	      .                                                              ⎕ 
 
2. Referential preferences and conditions of equilibrium 
 
We start with an example taken from (Aliprantis et al., 1989) to see how 
our groups' based approach is able to provide same results as the conventional 
one based on utility function.  
 
Example 3 
Let have an economy with two commodities and three agents and note 
that 	   ,     is the vector price. Utility functions of agents are     	     ,     
	     and 	         , and their initial endowment are 	     
 
  ,	     
 
   and 
     
 
   .  
These assumptions are extracted from example 1.4.10 in [Aliprantis & al, 
1989, p 34-35]. 
For us, all preferences are given by groups and their actions on	  
  . 
 
Consumer 1. The group of preference is the matricial subgroup     
 	 
 0
01 /    ,  0 .  
Its maximization problem 
 
        	   	  
       	  	   	          	            
 
where      ,  ,   is equivalent to finding the greatest  v such  that 
〈 ,  
 0
0
 
 
 	 1
1
 〉	     2  		⟺ since for each        ,    there is a unique 
	 	   	0	   	    0 with 	      
 0
0
 
 
  1
1
 .  
 
Then, we have to find 	   	 , such that  	 〈 
  
  
 , 
 
1/  〉      2  	 
which gives:         	
 
           2  		⟺    	
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Now,            reaches its optimum when  
  
    0, and this occurs 
at  	    	  
  
  
. Since for          
  
  
	 0, we have 
	   
    	 0, then we 
obtain           
  
  
   	
      
      
	.  
 
An easy calculation establishes the demand for the first consumer: 
 
    	
 
 
  
  
  
0
0
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
      
      
	∙	 1
1
    	 
      
   
,
      
   
 . 
 
Same argument and relatively simple calculation gives the following 
results: 
 
Consumer 2 The group is subgroup        	  
 0
01 /     ,  0 ,    
	
         
       
 reaches its maximum at     	 
   
  
    
where       	
     
   
   
  
 
 / 
    
  
   
 
 /  . From this, we deduce that the demand of 
the 2nd consumer is:  
    	 
       
   
,
     
   
 . 
 
Consumer 3 The group is     	 	    0
01 /  
 ,  0 , the maximum of 
      	
          
       
  is reached at     	 
  
   
   and       	
       
   
  
   
 
 / 
    
   
  
 
 / . 
Then we find     	 
       
   
,
       
   
  as the demand of consumer 3.  
To calculate the equilibrium price, it suffices to establish the common 
equilibrium condition:  
       ∑        
     	∑   
 
     0 . It follows immediately that 
 
    	     
   
,
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  	 	    1 , the value of price equilibrium,       	 
  
  ,
  
   . All these results 
are exactly the same obtained by the use of utility functions. 
Based on the above examples and results, we suggest to define a new 
mathematical framework of an exchange economy where the set I of agents is 
finite. This is to be defined as: 
 
Definition 6 
An exchange economy is said to be of referential preferences if: 
1)  The consumption set coincides with   
  ;  
2)  Each agent i has a non-zero initial endowment, i.e.,     	∈   
   and; 
3)  The preference relation ≽
i is referential (definition 1), and satisfies 
axiom 2, for all  ∈  . 
The proof of our main result (theorem 8) is based on the following 
mathematical result. 
 
Theorem 7.   Let    	  	 ∈	  ,      0	   	    1,2,…, ,			         
⋯      1   the set of all strictly positive prices. For a function	ζ ⋅   	 ζ  ⋅ ,
ζ  ⋅ ,…	,ζ  ⋅   from S into    assume that:  
1. ζ is continuous and bounded from below; 
2. ζ satisfies Walra's Law, i.e.,	  ∙ ζ p   0  holds for each 	  ∈  ;  
3.  p  	⊆ ,	    →       ,…,     and ,     0  imply that the sequence 
ζ      of the k
th  components of ζ     is bounded; and  
4. 	  	→ ∈  	with	     ⊆  	  imply  lim →∞‖ζ    ‖   	 ∞.   
 
Then, there exists at least one vector   ∈  	satisfying	ζ p   0 .  
For proof of theorem 7 we refer the reader to (Aliprantis et al., 1989,  
pp. 32-34).  
The main result of this paper is provided below: 
 
Theorem 8.  Every exchange economy of referential preferences has an 
equilibrium price. 
Proof. It is based on Theorem 7.According to theorem 3 and remark 4, the 
excess demand function in ERP is given by  :  →	  ,      	∑           
	∑       		∑ 	
〈  ∙ ,	  〉
〈 ,   ∙ 〉   
   ∙     ∙   ∈  	–   where   	∑      ∈	    
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First, continuity of  Z  is a consequence of continuity of application: 
 →	       ,  , →	   , the inversion of matrix, and scalar product on   . And 
since all     ∈	   
 
 , then Z is clearly bounded from below.  
Second, as       is the solution of maximization problem under the budget 
constraint then 〈 ,      〉  	〈 ,  〉 , and  〈 ,     〉  0  follows from the 
equality:       	∑           	∑      .  
Third, let now     	⊆ ,  	→      ,…,      and  ,     0. To see   
why the sequence         of  the  k
th component of          is  bounded,  
we consider remark 4 and this expression of demand function:   
∑           		∑ 	
〈  ∙ ,	  〉
〈 ,   ∙ 〉   
   ∙       ∙    ∈  . Since    ∈  , then the k
th component 
of  	   	   	   
  	 are nonnegative for all  n  and tend respectively to 
  	   	       , which clearly implies 	      
     is bounded for all	
	 	 ∈	 1,2,…,  , and consequently the same holds for	        .  
Last, it remains to prove that lim →∝‖Z    ‖    ∞    if     →  	∈
	  	with	     ⊆  .  Let   ∈ 1,2,…,    such  that      0 . Then    
 	→
0,and	   
  
  
→  ∞   which implies that the j
th component of individual 
demand tends to infinity, namely     
   ∙       ∙    
  →  ∞ for all consumer i. 
Since 
〈  ∙ ,	  〉
〈 ,   ∙ 〉 	 0 for  all  i, then	          	→ ∞  and it follows immediately 
that lim →∝‖Z    ‖    ∞.                                                                            □ 
 
Conclusions  
 
In his theory of value, Gerard Debreu wrote: “A state of the economy is a 
specification of the action of each agent ... But these actions are not necessarily 
compatible with the total resources. Can one find a price system which makes 
them compatible?” (Debreu, 1959, p. 74).  
In this work we prove that if all agents choose their preference in some 
group setting, and make their choice in compliance with a simple general rule 
of referential nature, then we can find a system of price which makes all choices 
compatible. 
An in depth work using additional examples will certainly allow us to 
come across other properties of referential preference and to better grasp its 
economic interpretations. 
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